Missives from a fly bottle
barang dot sg
Last revised 18 October 2017
8. A passage from Kripke

Here’s a passage from the American philosopher Saul Kripke, though he does not endorse what it says. (He thinks the argument is wrong.)
If something is known a priori it must be necessary, because it was known without looking at the world. If it depended on some contingent feature of the actual world, how could you know it without looking?
Well, even if wrong, these words do capture a natural way of thinking and Kripke relays it very succinctly.

The question is whether a truth known a priori is bound to be a necessary truth and the passage says yes. (This is from Naming and Necessity.)

As mentioned, Kripke disputes this and believes that some a priori truths are only contingently true! But we need not go into this. Our question just concerns the structure of the argument shown above.

What is it?